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Abstract 
The objective of this study was to investigate the effects of working memory, strategy 
availability, experience, and emotionality on a Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  Participants 
consisted of 126 undergraduates from Appalachian State University’s psychology research 
pool. A 3 (High Working Memory, Middle Working Memory, Low Working Memory) x 2 
(Strategy, No Strategy) x Trial Blocks design was employed.  The primary dependent 
measure was the frequency of cooperative decisions.  Students’ working memory spans were 
assessed using an automatic operational working memory span task.  Participants in the 
strategy condition were given information about the typical outcomes of Prisoner’s Dilemma 
games.  There was an unexpected finding: competition was positively correlated with overall 
winnings. This outcome resulted in the revision of some hypotheses that were based on the 
expectation that cooperative responses would lead to higher overall winnings.  After this 
revision, some of the main hypotheses were that: (a) players would become more competitive 
over time, (b) players in the strategy manipulation would be more cooperative than those in 
the control condition, (c) high working memory participants would be more competitive than 
those with middle and low working memory, and (d) working memory would buffer against 
the effects of emotionality in the game.  It was found that players became more competitive 
as the game progressed.  Participants in the strategy condition were more cooperative than 
those in the control condition.  The hypotheses that working memory would influence 
decisions and buffer against emotionality were not supported.  These new findings were 
examined in relation to reciprocity literature. 
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Influence of Working Memory, Strategy, Experience, and Emotionality 
 on a Prisoner’s Dilemma Task 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is a commonly used task for investigating cooperation and 
competition.  The traditional PD typically involves two men arrested for a crime 
(Poundstone, 1992).  The police do not have enough evidence to obtain a conviction.  
Therefore, they decide to separately question each man in hopes of getting one criminal to 
testify against the other.  The men are told that they will be rewarded for the information that 
they give.  If only one betrays the other, the betrayer receives no punishment while the 
betrayed individual receives a year in prison.  If they both keep their silence, they will each 
receive one month in prison on a misdemeanor charge.  Finally, if each betrays the other, 
then they both will receive three months in prison.  As the men are separated, they cannot 
know what the other will do.  Essentially, it is in each man’s best interest to betray the other, 
but the best outcome for the group occurs when each man keeps his silence. 
The dilemma becomes more interesting in its iterated form.  Although the best 
decision in a single trial situation is to compete, when matched with the same partner in 
multiple rounds, cooperation typically leads to a better overall outcome (Axelrod, 1984; 
Kassinove, Roth, Owens, & Fuller, 2002).  As the game is played several times, each 
individual has the opportunity to reward or punish the other for previous decisions.   
Axelrod (1984) identified four qualities of the most successful strategy in the PD.  
The qualities were labeled nice, retaliating, forgiving, and non-envious.  Nice describes not 
competing until the other player has competed.  Strategies that punish competition with 
competition are referred to as retaliating.  People employing a forgiving strategy sometimes 
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cooperate even after a competitive decision by the other person.  Finally, non-envious players 
are those that are unconcerned with having a better outcome than the other individual.    
The traditional PD game has been used in analyzing political situations (Clark & Lee, 
2005), economics (Arce, 2010), and climate change (Brennan, 2010).  Although cooperative 
strategies have been shown to lead to better overall outcomes, competitive strategies are 
often used in these situations (e.g., Clark & Lee, 2005).  An investigation of factors that 
result in competition in social dilemmas can offer some insight to why cooperative strategies 
are not invariably used. 
Factors Influencing Cooperation Versus Competition 
In an extensive review, Kopelman, Weber, and Messick (2002) identified nine factors 
that influence social dilemmas.  These factors are social motives (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 
1970), gender (e.g., van Lange, de Bruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997), payoff structure (e.g., 
Bell, Petersen, & Hautaluoma, 1989), uncertainty (e.g., Budescu, Rapoport, & Suleiman, 
1990), power and status (e.g., Massey, Zelditch, & Freeman, 1997), group size (e.g., Kerr, 
1989), communication (e.g., Bohnet & Frey, 1999), causes (e.g., Hoffman & Spitzer, 1985) 
and frames (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  This investigation will examine the influence 
of two other factors that could affect the resolution of social dilemmas, emotionality and 
working memory (WM). 
Threat and emotionality.  A study by Deutsch and Krauss (1960) investigated the 
impact of threat on competition.  Researchers manipulated the amount of threat that was 
available to two participants in a social dilemma game.  Two players controlled different 
hypothetical companies; each was trying to make as much money as possible. Winnings were 
directly related to the speed with which the trucks were delivered to their destinations.  There 
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were two possible paths, a direct route with a stretch of one lane road and an alternate, but 
longer route, that was always clear.  If the trucks met on the one lane section of the shorter 
road, neither could proceed until the lane had been cleared by the other truck.   
Deutsch and Krauss (1960) varied the number of players who had the ability to 
threaten the other.  Neither player in the no-threat condition could threaten the other.  In the 
unilateral threat manipulation, one participant could threaten the other.  Both individuals in 
the bilateral threat condition could threaten the other.  These threats were delivered via gates 
on the shorter road.  Closing the gate blocked the other player’s truck from continuing.  The 
game was structured so that cooperative responses yielded faster delivery times, resulting in 
greater overall payoffs. 
Deutsch and Krauss (1960) found that when neither player could threaten the other, 
they often worked together through turn taking. Due to this, players in the no-threat condition 
experienced the highest individual and overall payoffs of the three conditions.  Unilateral 
threat augmented competition, reducing the payoff for both participants.  In the bilateral 
threat manipulation, players competed more than in the unilateral threat condition; their 
monetary winnings were the lowest of the three groups.  These results suggest that as the 
availability of threat increases, cooperation is attenuated.   
One interpretation of Deutsch and Krauss’s (1960) experiment is that threat induces 
anger which in turn augments competition.  Kassinove et al. (2002) provided a test of this 
hypothesis.  They had participants respond to the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory 
(Spielberger, 1988) both before and after a PD task.  As predicted, players with higher levels 
of reported anger were also significantly more likely to compete in the task.  Other 
investigators (e.g., van Kleef, van Dijk, Steinel, Harinck, & van Beest, 2008) have reported 
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similar results; anger was associated with higher levels of competition when confronted with 
social dilemmas. 
If anger increases competition, then it is reasonable to propose that positive emotions 
might heighten cooperation. If we may generalize from the prosocial literature, then a 
number of studies provide support for this proposition.  Algoe and Haidt (2009) found that 
viewing prosocial behaviors by others can lead to a state of “elevation” or a general 
improvement in mood and disposition due to gratitude or admiration. Additional research by 
Schnall, Roper, and Fessler (2010) revealed that helping behavior increases when 
participants experienced a state of elevation.  This prosocial behavior is also not necessarily 
directed at the individual who performed the cooperative act, signifying a general increase in 
helping behaviors.   The literature leaves little doubt that emotionality is associated with 
cooperative and competitive decisions and prosocial behaviors. 
 WM.  WM, or an individual’s information processing capacity, can be viewed as a 
hierarchical system, with one central executive system controlling three lower systems.  The 
three subordinate systems are the visuo-spatial sketchpad, the phonological loop, and the 
episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000).  Due to the central role of WM, it has been implemented in 
a wide range of tasks including risky decision making (Cokely & Kelley, 2009), attention 
regulation (Engle, 2002), and emotional regulation (Schmeichel, Volokhov, & Demaree, 
2008). 
 In an experimental study, Milinski and Wedekind (1998) examined the impact of 
constraining WM on decisions made during a PD game.  Two commonly used strategies in a 
traditional PD game were Memory-1, also known as tit for tat (TFT), and Memory-2, which 
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is also called Pavlovian (Milinski & Wedekind, 1998).  These strategies vary in both their 
complexity and effectiveness. 
 In a basic TFT strategy, the player always copies the other player’s previous decision.  
Because of this, a TFT strategy only takes into account the other player’s decision in the 
prior round (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993).  A more common variant of the TFT is the generous 
tit for tat (GTFT) strategy (Milinski & Wedekind, 1998).  When using a GTFT strategy, the 
player typically copies the other player’s previous decision, but occasionally chooses to 
cooperate after the other participant has competed.  Presumably, players engage in GTFT in 
an attempt to generate cooperation.  
A Pavlovian strategy is more complex, taking into account both players’ decisions in 
the previous round.  Participants using this Memory-2 strategy follow a win-stay, lose-shift 
paradigm (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993).  A player using this Pavlovian strategy will always 
cooperate following dual cooperation.  The player will never cooperate following a trial in 
which the player cooperated and the other individual competed.  If the player competed and 
the other player cooperated, then the player will compete again.  Following dual competition, 
the player will usually cooperate.  Through simulation, Memory-2 strategies were found to 
be more efficient in terms of winnings than Memory-1 strategies (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993). 
Memory-1 and Memory-2 strategies are also differentiated by the amount of 
information that must be remembered.  Using a TFT strategy, the only response to be 
recalled was the other player’s decision in the previous round.  The Pavlovian strategy 
requires both players’ decisions from the previous round to be recalled.  As a Memory-2 
strategy requires twice as much information as a Memory-1 strategy, Milinski and Wedekind 
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(1998) hypothesized that constraining the players’ WM would result in those participants 
using simpler strategies that require less information. 
 Student participants played the PD game in either constrained or unconstrained 
memory conditions.  Students assigned to the unconstrained memory condition played a 
typical PD game, but participants in the constrained memory condition performed a 
distracting task between each round of the PD.  Milinski and Wedekind (1998) found that as 
predicted, a Pavlovian strategy was used less in the constrained than the unconstrained 
condition.   
The investigators hypothesized that the distracting task had four effects on WM.  It 
limited the number of choices remembered by dissipating the recency effect, used WM 
capacity for the task information, prevented rehearsal of stored information, and increased 
the available time for information to decay.  Support for this hypothesis was tested by asking 
students to recall both players’ decisions from each round of play.  Participants in the 
unconstrained memory condition were able to recall decisions with 75% accuracy for the 
final two rounds of play.  Those in the constrained condition were only able to recall 
decisions with 75% accuracy for the final round of play. 
The results of the Melinski and Wedekind’s (1998) study suggest that a larger WM 
capacity will be beneficial in making efficient decisions in a traditional PD game.  It is 
important to recognize that using the Pavlovian strategy maximized expected values.  Players 
with higher WM capacity seem to have a greater ability to use complex strategies to elicit 
cooperation and punish competition as seen in their higher total winnings.  The ability to 
remember more information is important as it allows the player to use reciprocal interactions 
to achieve maximum payoff.   
INFLUENCE OF WORKING MEMORY ON PRISONER’S DILEMMA                             9 
 
Another area of interest is the relationship between WM and frames in decision 
making.  Cokely and Kelley (2009) presented participants with a choice between two 
different possible winnings with different expected values.  For example, participants could 
choose to either receive a 100% chance for five dollars or a 5% chance for 200 dollars, 
resulting in expected values of five dollars and ten dollars, respectively.  There were also 
some situations where the riskier decision resulted in a lower expected value.  For example, 
participants could choose between a 75% chance at 100 dollars and a 10% chance at 500 
dollars.  These options yield expected values of 75 and 50 dollars, respectively.  Overall, 
high WM players were less affected by the framing of the task and more influenced by 
expected values than low WM individuals.   
A related finding in WM research that is important for this study is the role of WM on 
delayed discounting.  Delayed discounting is the general trend to value rewards that occur 
sooner over those that occur after a longer period of time (Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 
1997).  Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney (2003) found that as WM load increases, the rate of 
delayed discounting increases as well.  Limits on WM function were associated with an 
impulsive decision-making style.  This finding is relevant to the current study due to how it 
could affect decision making in the PD.  In the traditional PD game, competition leads to 
gaining the most money in a short period of time, but cooperation can lead to larger overall 
gains over a longer period of time.  This research also suggests that those individuals with 
larger WM capacity make decisions that are more consistent with expected value 
calculations.   
Cokely and Kelley’s (2009) and Hinson et al.’s (2003) results do not necessarily 
indicate that high WM people are insensitive to frames.  A study by Corbin, McElroy, and
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Black (2010) found that when the expected values of two choices are equal, high WM 
capacity participants were more strongly influenced by positive and negative frames than 
those with low WM capacity.  When considered together, the findings of Cokley and Kelley 
(2009), Corbin et al. (2010), and Hinson et al. (2003), suggest that expected values and 
frames are considered by high WM participants when making choices, but that people with 
higher WM capacity are more strongly influenced by expected value than frames.  
A theory of WM proposed by Engle (2002) offers a means of understanding the 
relationship of WM to expected values in social dilemmas.  Engle (2002) proposes that WM 
capacity “represents a domain free limitation in ability to control attention” (p. 19).  This 
proposition is supported by findings by Kane and Engle (2000) that constraining WM 
capacity increased proactive interference on a memory retrieval task.  Similarly Kane, 
Bleckley, Conway, and Engle (2001) found that individuals with higher WM capacity were 
better able to regulate eye movements in an antisaccade task.  Studies using a Stroop task 
(Kane & Engle, 2003) and a dichotic listening task (Conway, Cowen, & Bunting, 2001) also 
support the proposition that WM capacity enhances the ability to focus attention.  If WM 
capacity does represent the ability to control attention, as Engle contends, then any 
distracting information should be less influential on individuals with higher WM capacity 
than those with lower WM capacity. 
 Interaction of emotionality and WM.  If emotionality is viewed as a non-central 
part of a PD game, then we should expect that emotions and WM should combine to 
determine player’s responses.  Specifically, high WM should serve as a buffer against the 
influence of positive and negative emotions.  A study by Schmeichel et al. (2008) 
investigated how WM capacity influenced participants’ outward expressions and inward 
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experiences of emotion.  In this multiple part study, the researchers attempted to elicit 
emotional responses using film clips.  For example, in the first study participants were shown 
a two minute clip of animal mutilation and slaughter.  This clip had previously been shown to 
increase negative emotionality, particularly disgust.  In the second part of the study, to elicit 
happiness, participants were shown a two minute comedy clip from a late night talk show.  In 
other parts of the study, additional methods of generating emotionality were used.  As they 
watched the film clips, participants were instructed to keep their faces neutral and not show 
outward reaction to the clips.   
Schmeichel et al. (2008) found that those persons with higher WM capacity 
suppressed expressions of negative and positive emotion by not moving their faces better 
than those with lower WM capacity.  Furthermore, people with higher WM capacity thought 
about emotional stimuli in a more analytical and unemotional way than individuals with 
lower WM capacity.   
A subsequent study by Schmeichel and Demaree (2010) found that participants with 
higher WM capacity experienced less unpleasant emotional response to false negative 
feedback about an emotional intelligence test.  In addition, higher WM persons were better 
able to make constructive use of negative feedback than lower WM counterparts.  In general, 
these findings indicate that individuals with higher WM capacity are more likely to self-
regulate their automatic emotional reactions than those with lower WM capacity.  Again, 
people with higher WM capacity were more task oriented and less influenced by distracting 
information than people with lower WM capacity. 
Other studies have shown similar relationships between negative emotions and WM 
capacity.  Klein and Boals (2001) found that participants with more life event stress received 
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lower scores on measures of WM.  A related study by Schmader and Johns (2003) revealed 
that remembering negative self-relevant stereotypes reduced WM capacity.  Schmader and 
Johns (2003) also found that the reduction in WM capacity was a mediating factor in the 
influence of stereotype threat on participants’ math performance.  So not only does research 
show that individuals with lower WM capacity are more susceptible to emotionality 
(Schmeichel & Demaree, 2010; Schmeichel et al., 2008), but emotionality can attenuate 
peoples’ WM capacity (Klein & Boals, 2001; Schmader & Johns, 2003). 
Purpose of Present Study 
 The objective of this investigation is to further examine the effects of WM, 
knowledge of effective game strategy, and experience on a PD task.  A 3 (High WM, Middle 
WM, Low WM) x 2 (Strategy, No Strategy) x Trial Blocks design will be used.  The WM 
and strategy variables are between factors, and the trials variable is within factors.  The 
dependent variable is the players’ responses (cooperative or competitive) on a PD task.  The 
preceding literature suggests that cooperative choices generally lead to the highest overall 
payoffs.  Therefore, there should be a statistically significant positive correlation between the 
number of cooperative choices a player makes and that player’s overall payoff.     
 WM should yield a statistically significant main effect.  The literature shows that the 
choices of persons with high WM are particularly influenced by expected value.  Given that 
cooperative responses produce better payoffs, players with high WM are predicted to make 
more cooperative decisions than low WM participants.   
 A main effect for the trials variable is also predicted.  As the students gain experience 
over multiple trials, they should identify which strategies and choices are most effective.  If 
INFLUENCE OF WORKING MEMORY ON PRISONER’S DILEMMA                           13 
 
cooperation is the most effective choice in terms of payoffs, then over trials the participants 
should become more cooperative. 
 In this study, players in the strategy manipulation will be told that cooperation usually 
leads to the greatest overall payoffs.  Players in the no strategy condition will not be given 
this information.  Thus, a main effect for strategy is hypothesized; participants in the strategy 
manipulation will be more cooperative than those in the no strategy manipulation. 
  A WM x Trials ordinal interaction is hypothesized.   Because the decisions of players 
with high WM are governed by expected value, they should be more cooperative on earlier 
trials than players with low WM.  However, after a large number of trials have passed, all of 
the individuals will learn from experience and are hypothesized to reach similar levels of 
cooperation.  The result should be a statistically significant ordinal interaction.   
 A similar logic applies to the Strategy x Trials interaction.  Players in the strategy 
group will be told that cooperation generally maximizes long term payoffs.  During early 
trials, players in the strategy group should be more cooperative sooner than those in the no-
strategy group.  Given sufficient trials, all participants will likely reach high levels of 
cooperation.  Thus, an interaction is predicted between strategy and trials. 
 It is not clear whether there will be a statistically significant WM x Strategy 
interaction.  Both high WM and strategy should enhance cooperation.  Currently, there is 
insufficient evidence to judge whether these variables combine in an additive or 
multiplicative manner.  Also, there is no hypothesis regarding a three way WM x Strategy x 
Trials interaction. 
 Previous research has found that cooperative actions are associated with positive 
emotions, and competitive actions are associated with negative emotions (e.g., Algoe & 
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Haidt, 2009; Kassinove et al., 2002).  Therefore, it is predicted that following a cooperative 
decision by the other player in the proceeding round, the participant is more likely to be 
cooperative than competitive.  Following the same logic, after a competitive response by the 
other player in the previous round, the individual is predicted to be more likely to respond 
competitively than cooperatively.  Most importantly to this investigation, it is hypothesized 
that WM should buffer the effects of emotionality. As research has revealed that higher WM 
reduces emotionality (Schmeichel et al., 2008), the probability that participants’ responses 
are emotionally affected by their opponents’ responses is expected to be lower for high WM 
players than those with low WM. 
 As this is an unusual method for looking at the effects of emotionality, an example is 
useful to demonstrate how this measure functions.  There are two participants who are 
responding in a PD game.  The first is strongly affected by emotionality.  Because of this, 
after the other player cooperates, the emotional player cooperates 90% of the time.  After the 
other player competes, the emotional player only cooperates 20% of the time.  The difference 
between these numbers results in a score of 70%.  The second player is not strongly affected 
by emotionality.  After the other player cooperates, the nonemotional player only cooperates 
70% of the time.  After the other player competes, the nonemotional player cooperates 30% 
of the time.  His score would be 40%.  As intended, the higher score on the difference 
between the two percentages reveals a stronger effect of emotionality on decision making. 
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and twenty-six undergraduates (83 females and 43 males) from 
Appalachian State University’s psychology research pool participated in exchange for course 
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credit.  The average age of participants was 19.94 years (SD = 2.18; range = 17 – 29).  
Treatment of participants was in accordance with the American Psychological Association 
Ethics Code (2002).  Approval was also obtained from the Appalachian State Institutional 
Review Board on April 27, 2011 (see Appendix A). 
Materials 
 Operational Span (OSPAN) task.  Memory capacity was assessed by an automated 
computer version of the OSPAN task (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).  Each trial 
began with a math operation.  The first screen of each trial displayed a math problem, for 
example, (2 * 3) – 2.  Once the student thought he or she knew the answer, the student 
clicked a mouse button. The next screen displayed a number that was or was not the correct 
answer.  The student then used the mouse to indicate if the answer on the screen was correct.   
 Next, a letter was shown for 800 ms.  Each round consisted of three to seven trials.  
At the end of each round, the participants were asked to recall the letters in the order they 
were presented.  A screen displayed 12 letters, including all letters presented in the previous 
round.  Students used the mouse to select what they believed to be the correct letter sequence.  
When the participant felt that all letters had been identified, she or he selected the “exit” 
button.  After every round, the screen showed the participant’s average math score and the 
number of letters correctly recalled. 
 PD task.  Levels of cooperation and competition were measured by a PD game 
hosted on a server at the University of Virginia Economics Department 
(http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/games.php).  This task allowed the participants to play 
against each other without knowing who was matched with whom for individual rounds.  
Therefore, every round of the game was similar to a one-shot trial.  If both participants 
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cooperated, they each received eighty points.  When one cooperated and the other competed, 
the cooperator received nothing and the competitor received one hundred points.  If each 
participant chose to compete, they each received thirty points.  Participants played twenty 
rounds; on each round they knew that they were randomly matched to a new partner.   
Procedure 
 Participants were tested in groups ranging from four to twelve in size.  Once all 
participants arrived, they were presented with an informed consent form that summarized the 
procedure (see Appendix B).  The experimenter then told the participants that they would 
first complete a measure of WM.  Instructions for the OSPAN task were delivered via 
computer.  Participants were told that they would be evaluated on their math score and on 
recalling the correct letters in the proper order.  A recall error was recorded if the participant 
recorded an incorrect letter or reported letters in the incorrect sequence.  
 Each of fifteen rounds consisted of three to seven trials, determined in a random 
order.  This made for a total of 75 letters and 75 math problems.  The typical time to 
complete the OSPAN task was between twenty and twenty-five minutes.  After all students 
finished the OSPAN task, the experimenter instructed them to begin the PD.   
Players were in the same room with visual contact, but could not see one another’s 
choices. Students were given the goal of gaining as many points as possible. In order to 
evaluate the effects of knowledge strategy use in the PD, half of the participants were 
randomly assigned to a control condition and half to a strategy condition.  Participants in the 
control condition were told the rules for the PD game and what decisions resulted in what 
outcomes, but they were given no strategies or advice.  In addition to these basic instructions, 
participants in the strategy condition were told by the experimenter: 
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To give you some background on how the Prisoner’s Dilemma game works and an 
idea for your choices in this game, I will review some general game play findings.  
While it may feel that your decision may not matter one way or the other in this 
game, there are a few strategies.  Most often people initially feel that choosing to 
compete is the best option.  If you choose to compete, you will be better rewarded 
than if you choose to cooperate for each individual round.  You always gain more 
competing than you do cooperating on a round to round basis.   
 However, over time it is typically beneficial to cooperate in this dilemma.  If 
everyone was to compete in every round, then the winnings would be less than half 
than if everyone was to choose to cooperate in every round.  Typically, those groups 
that cooperate show higher winnings over a period of time.  However, as you will be 
matched with a random person in every round, you cannot build a pattern with a 
single partner.  Ultimately, the choice is yours every round, and how you choose to 
gain as many points as possible is up to you. 
Twenty PD trials were performed.  The entire session, OSPAN and PD tasks, 
typically lasted forty-five minutes.  Participants were not given any financial compensation; 
all received the same amount of course credit for serving.  Students were then thanked, 
debriefed, and encouraged to ask questions. 
Results 
 The current study defined OSPAN score as the sum of all perfectly recalled sets 
(Unsworth et al., 2005).  For example, “if an individual correctly recalled 3 letters in a set 
size of 3, 4 letters in a set size of 4, and 3 letters in a set size of 5, his or her OSPAN score 
would be 7” (Unsworth et al., 2005, p. 501).  The sample was divided into thirds based on 
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their OSPAN scores (high, M = 58.05, SD = 6.66; middle, M = 41.14, SD = 4.44; and low, M 
= 22.12, SD = 8.23). For the purpose of analyses, the twenty PD trials were divided into five 
four-trial blocks.  For all analyses, an alpha of .05 was used. 
First, a correlation was run in order to determine the relationship between decisions 
made and overall winnings in the PD task.  The prediction that there would be a positive 
correlation between the number of cooperative decisions and total payoffs was not supported.  
Instead the correlation was statistically significant and negative, r = -.34, p < .001. 
 Next, a 3 (High WM, Middle WM, Low WM) x 2 (Strategy, No Strategy) x 5 (Trial 
Blocks 1-4, Trial Blocks 5-8, Trial Blocks 9-12, Trial Blocks 13-16, Trial Blocks 17-20) 
ANOVA was conducted.  WM and strategy were between-subjects variables, and trial blocks 
was a within-subjects variable.  The dependent measure was the number of cooperative 
responses.  The main effect of WM was not statistically significant, F(2, 119) = 1.06, p = .35, 
	= .018. Participants in the strategy condition (M = 8.88, SD = 4.87) were significantly 
more likely to cooperate, F(1, 119) = 14.70, p < .001,  = .11, than participants in the no 
strategy condition (M = 5.84, SD = 4.01).  
 A statistically significant main effect for trial blocks was also found, F(4, 476) = 
16.34, p < .001,  = .12.  Subsequent pairwise comparisons using least significant 
difference testing evaluated differences between trial blocks.  Participants were significantly 
more cooperative in Trial Block 1 (M = 1.93, SD = 1.25), than in Block 2 (M = 1.62, SD = 
1.15), Block 3 (M = 1.30, SD = 1.13), Block 4 (M = 1.36, SD = 1.22), or Block 5 (M = 1.17, 
SD = 1.17).  They were also significantly more cooperative during Trial Block 2 than during 
Block 3, Block 4, or Block 5.  No statistically significant differences in levels of cooperation 
between Blocks 3, 4, and 5 were found, all ps > .05.   
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 There was no significant interaction between WM and trial blocks, F(8, 476) = 1.29, 
p = .25,   = .02.  Neither was the strategy by trial blocks interaction statistically 
significant, F(4, 476) = 0.21, p = .93,   = .002.  Finally, the WM by strategy interaction 
yielded no statistically significant interaction, F(2, 119) = 2.60, p = .079,   = .042.  The 
three-way interaction between WM, strategy, and trial blocks was statistically significant, 
F(8, 476) = 2.03, p = .041,   = .033. 
 A final analysis was performed to investigate the hypothesis that WM buffered the 
effects of emotionality.  If this supposition is correct, then the difference between the 
percentage of cooperative decisions following cooperative responses by the other player and 
the percentage of cooperative decisions following competitive responses by the other player 
should be less for high WM than low WM participants.  The measure was labeled “emotional 
difference” and served as the dependent measure in the following analysis.  The three levels 
of WM served as the independent variables.  The resulting one-way ANOVA was not 
statistically significant, F(2, 122) = 0.40, p = .67,  = .007. 
Discussion 
 This experiment investigated the impact of multiple factors on the choices individuals 
made in a PD game.  The first hypothesis was that individuals who made more cooperative 
decisions would have higher payoffs.  The results did not support this hypothesis, and instead 
revealed an inverse relationship between the number of cooperative choices that participants 
made and their overall winnings.  It is likely that this unexpected finding is due to the 
structure of the experiment and the importance of reciprocity in social dilemmas; I will 
revisit reciprocity later in this discussion.  
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 Hypothesis Two was that participants with higher WM capacity would be more 
cooperative.  This prediction was made because individuals with higher WM capacity make 
decisions that are consistent with higher expected value calculations, and cooperative 
responses were expected to be economically superior to competitive responses.  The finding 
that cooperative responses were inversely related to higher payoffs logically reverses the 
predictions for Hypothesis Two.  In light of this, it should be hypothesized that participants 
with higher WM capacity will make more competitive decisions relative to lower WM 
capacity individuals.  The results did not support this hypothesis as there was no statistically 
significant difference in choices between higher and lower WM capacity participants. 
 Hypothesis Three was that participants in the strategy condition would be more likely 
to cooperate than those in the no strategy condition, and the findings from this study 
supported the hypothesis.  This prediction was not altered by the finding that competition 
was related to higher overall payoffs.  The logic behind this hypothesis was that when 
participants were told that cooperative decisions usually led to higher payoffs, they would be 
more likely to be cooperative.  Therefore, this manipulation functioned as expected. 
 Hypothesis Four was that, over time, the participants would become more 
cooperative.  This was based on the expectation that cooperative decisions would lead to 
higher payoffs, and as people gained experience, they would alter their responses toward the 
higher payoff of cooperation.  However, the unexpected finding that cooperation was 
inversely related to higher payoffs logically reversed what would have been predicted, 
making competition the best choice for higher payoffs.  Therefore, it seems prudent to revise 
this approach and revisit Hypothesis Four.  In doing so, the prediction that participants will 
migrate toward the strategy with the higher payoff is still valid, but the best strategy in this 
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situation involves competition rather than cooperation.   Therefore, in light of this, people 
should become more competitive over time.  The results supported this revised hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis Five was that WM would buffer against the effects of emotionality.  The 
results of this research did not support this prediction.  There are several possible reasons that 
a significant effect was not found for this hypothesis.  As the primary focus of the 
participants was to achieve their highest possible score, the main focus of their decision 
making process was to generate the best economic outcome, not to fulfill emotional desires.  
Because of this, the effect size for the emotional influence on decision making was expected 
to be relatively small.  Also, the structure of the experiment indirectly led to limited 
variability in participant responses, producing a vast majority of competitive responses 
(approximately 70%).  Because of this competitive environment, there were very few 
opportunities for participants to experience positive emotionality from the other player’s 
cooperation.  Therefore, although WM may actually work to buffer emotional decision 
making, the small effect size and lack of variability in the current design makes it difficult to 
observe this effect. 
 Two interactions were also hypothesized.  First, a WM x Trials interaction was 
predicted, but the results did not support the hypothesis.  A Strategy x Trials interaction was 
predicted as well, but the results did not support this hypothesis.  Finally, an unpredicted 
three-way interaction between WM, strategy, and trial blocks was found to be statistically 
significant.  However, this interaction was not predicted and had an extremely small effect 
size, indicating limited theoretical value for this interaction. 
 The finding that WM did not have a main effect on the number of cooperative 
decisions seems, at first, surprising.  Recall that the study by Milinski and Wedekind (1998) 
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demonstrated that players with larger WM capacity used more complex and effective 
strategies which led them to become cooperative.  With this in mind, the expectation was that 
WM would have a similar influence on decisions in the current investigation.  However, the 
findings from the current study were inconsistent with those reported by Milinski and 
Wedekind. I will next discuss possible reasons for this discrepancy. 
 One reason for this discrepancy may be that the Milinski and Wedekind (1998) study 
utilized a more traditional type of PD game.  Specifically, the participants believed that they 
were playing against the same person for the entire duration of the game.  In actuality they 
were playing against a confederate to balance opponent responses, but they were not aware 
of this.  Because participants in the Milinski and Wedekind study believed that they were 
playing against the same opponent, they were able to develop and use strategies from the 
interactions between themselves and their opponent across many previous rounds.  
Importantly, both the TFT and the Pavlovian strategies require knowledge of the other 
player’s response from the preceding round.  
 Unlike the Milinski and Wedekind (1998) study, participants in the current 
investigation were matched with new partners in every round.  This removed the ability of 
the player to reward or punish the other player for previous responses.  Therefore, 
participants were no longer able to use either the TFT or the Pavlovian strategies.  In the 
current investigation the most effective response was competition within every round.  As 
this strategy is not complex and does not require players to remember previous responses, 
WM did not have an effect on players’ decisions.  Therefore, this may explain why WM 
capacity was an important factor in effective decision making in the Milinski and Wedekind 
study, but it did not have a significant impact on decision making in the current study. 
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 The differences in the type of PD game used in the Milinski and Wedekind (1998) 
investigation and the current experiment highlight the importance of reciprocity as a factor in 
social dilemma games.  The possibility of reciprocity is an element inherent in most social 
dilemma situations.  It is also likely that reciprocity will influence the kind of strategy that 
decision makers will use in social situations (Nowak, 2006).  For example, if there is a 
limited amount of a desired resource, then the goal of the individual is to obtain as much of 
the resource as possible.  As a result, in situations where reciprocity is possible, then the 
cooperation of others benefits everyone because all are able to obtain more of the resource 
with the cooperative helpfulness of others.  However, when there is no possibility of 
reciprocity, then the best strategy is to take as much of the resource as possible (Akcay, 
Reed, Campbell, Templeton, & Beecher, 2010; Taylor & Nowak, 2007).   
 Due to the structure of social dilemmas, those who compete are always better 
rewarded on a single trial than those who cooperate.  Therefore, for cooperation to take place, 
certain situations must be present.  Research has identified five mechanisms that lead to 
cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and 
group selection (Nowak, 2006; Taylor & Nowak, 2007).  Due to the random structuring of 
groups in an experimental setting, kin selection, network reciprocity, and group selection are 
not possible avenues for cooperative behavior; however, reciprocity likely does occur.  Direct 
reciprocity is based on repeated interactions between two individuals that lead to 
cooperation.  Indirect reciprocity occurs when an individual’s reputation is known, and due 
to this reputation others are more likely to cooperate with that person (Akcay et al., 2010).  
Because players in the current game were anonymous, direct reciprocity is the only one of 
the five mechanisms that could affect cooperation in this investigation.  
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 Since direct reciprocity is the only means available for eliciting cooperation in the 
present study, it is important to understand the factors that allow for it.  Nowak (2006) found 
that under direct reciprocity, cooperation only occurs if the probability of another encounter 
between the same two individuals exceeds the cost-to-benefit ratio of the cooperative act. In 
the current study, the cost-to-benefit ratio is equal to the likelihood of future interactions.  As 
the probability of additional encounters did not exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio, cooperation 
was not elicited through direct reciprocity.  Traditional PD games have a likelihood of future 
encounters that exceeds the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperative acts.  This allows participants 
in those tasks to cooperate through direct reciprocity.  However, in games where there is little 
chance of future interaction, the cost of cooperation is too great. 
Limitations 
There were several shortcomings in this study that, if altered, may provide a more 
accurate means for testing the hypotheses in the future.  One of the shortcomings was the 
oversight of the importance of reciprocity in social dilemmas.  Had the study been conducted 
in a way that allowed for direct reciprocity to occur, there may have been greater variability 
in participant responses.  Consequently, this would allow players to use multiple strategies to 
increase their gains as much as possible.  Those individuals who were able to elicit 
cooperation from others would have been rewarded with higher payoffs themselves.  
However, players who relied on competition would have induced others players toward 
competition and this would have decreased their overall totals.  Further, the overall increase 
in strategy variability should allow high WM participants to use more complex and efficient 
strategies that should produce a main effect for WM capacity. 
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 Another potential limitation that could have hindered clarity of the results was the 
number of participants within the respective conditions.  There were a total of six between 
subject blocks (High WM, Middle WM, Low WM x Strategy, No Strategy) and 126 
participants; therefore, only around twenty individuals were in each block.  Although this 
number of participants did reveal significant main effects, other effects may have been 
weaker and having thirty people in each block would give more power to the statistical 
analysis and potentially reveal smaller effects.   
 Another important limitation in this study was the absence of a validated measure of 
emotionality.  Recall that emotionality was measured by analyzing the difference between 
the percentage of cooperative responses following cooperative responses by the other player 
and the percentage of cooperative responses following competitive responses by the other 
player.  However, there is no way to guarantee that the difference in responses is due to 
emotionality.  An example of how this measure could be inaccurate can be found by looking 
at responses in a TFT strategy.  In a true TFT strategy, the percentage of cooperative 
responses following cooperation would be 100%, and the percentage of cooperative 
responses following a competitive response would be 0%, resulting in a score of one.  The 
individual may have made the decision to use a TFT strategy and to ignore his or her 
emotional responses completely, but the score of one indicates a participant who is strongly 
affected by emotion.  In hindsight, using a measure that has been validated to quantify 
emotionality is more desirable and could have provided strong evidence to support the 
contention that WM serves as a buffer against emotionality. 
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Future Research 
Looking forward to future research, two main paths of inquiry seem most deserving 
for future investigation.  One possible path is to modify the situation to allow for different 
methods of generating cooperation.  Recall that Nowak (2006) identified five mechanisms 
that allowed for the evolution of cooperation.  Using this as a basis, different experiments 
could be constructed to investigate cooperation through these different mechanisms.   
 For example, one type of PD game involves pairing participants on multiple 
consecutive trials which allows for direct reciprocity.  When this method is incorporated, it 
creates a situation within which the probability of future interactions is larger than the cost-
to-benefit ratio.  Another interesting approach to this method would be to incorporate a way 
for individuals to develop and display their reputations of cooperation and competition in the 
PD game.  Specifically, if a participant’s likelihood of cooperation or competition is 
displayed to the other player before a round, then his or her level of reciprocity would be 
readily apparent. 
 Another factor that should continue to be investigated is the effect of WM on the PD 
game.  The current investigation was relatively limited in that WM was measured, but it was 
not manipulated.  The literature shows multiple examples of methods for manipulating 
participants WM capacity while performing the main task (e.g., Hinson et al., 2003, & 
Milinski & Wedekind, 1998).  For example, these studies have used distraction tasks, such as 
remembering a short list of numbers, which act to utilize a portion of an individual’s WM 
capacity, effectively decreasing the WM available for the task at hand.  By utilizing a within 
subjects design, decision making could be investigated when WM is unconstrained and when 
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it is limited.  Further, this method would allow for a within participants analysis and the 
effects of WM capacity could be more effectively investigated. 
 In conclusion, previous research has shown that WM influences decision making 
(e.g., Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Corbin et al., 2010; Hinson et al., 2003) including decisions 
made in social dilemmas (Milinski & Wedekind, 1998).  Further, a good deal of research has 
shown that PD games are a good way of analyzing social dilemma situations.  The current 
study highlights the importance of considering additional factors that may come to bare on 
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Consent to Participate in Research 
Information to Consider About this Research 
 
Opinions and activities 
Principal Investigator: Wilson Tucker 
Department: Psychology 
Contact Information:  Dr. Todd McElroy, Psychology Department, Appalachian State 
University, Boone NC. 28608.  (828) 262-2720  
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
You are being invited to take part in a research study about individual differences in working 
memory and how that affects various constructs.  If you take part in this study, you will be 
one of about 200 people to do so.  By doing this study we hope to learn about how working 
memory influences a person’s interaction with other people.  
 
What will I be asked to do? 
The research procedures will be conducted at the department of psychology in the Smith-
Wright building.  You will need to come here once during the study.  When you come to your 
session you will complete the OSPAN, which is a measure of working memory.  You will 
then participate in a decision making task.  The total amount of time you will be asked to 
volunteer for this study is forty-five minutes.  
 
What are possible harms or discomforts that I might experience during the research? 
 
There is a risk of a breach of confidentiality as certain questions in the surveys ask sensitive 
questions that you may want to keep confidential.  For this reason all surveys will not have 
your name, but rather a subject number.  Only the researchers will have access to the 
identifiers that indicate each subject’s identity.  At the completion of the data gathering 
segment of the experiment, the information linking the subject to their subject number will be 
deleted.  
    
What are the possible benefits of this research? 
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There may be no personal benefit from your participation but the information gained by 
doing this research may help others in the future.   
This study should help us learn about how individual differences that people possess 
influence their behaviors. 
 
Will I be paid for taking part in the research? 
You will receive two ELC’s for taking part in this research.  No monetary awards will be 
given for participation in this study. 
 
How will you keep my private information confidential? 
Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study 
there will be no identifiers to determine individual identities. When we write up the study to 
share it with other researchers, we will write about the combined information. You will not be 
identified in any published or presented materials. 
We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research from knowing that 
you gave us information or what that information is. However, there are some circumstances 
in which we may have to show your information to other people.  We may be required to 
show information that identifies you to people who need to be sure that we have done the 
research correctly, such as Appalachian’s Institutional Review Board.   
 
Who can I contact if I have questions? 
The people conducting this study will be available to answer any questions concerning this 
research, now or in the future.  You may contact the Principal Investigator’s faculty advisor 
at [(828)262-2720].    If you have questions about your rights as someone taking part in 
research, contact the Appalachian Institutional Review Board Administrator at 828-262-2130 
(days), through email at irb@appstate.edu or at Appalachian State University, Office of 
Research and Sponsored Programs, IRB Administrator, Boone, NC 28608. 
 
Do I have to participate?  What else should I know? 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  If you choose not to volunteer, 
there will be no penalty and you will not lose any benefits or rights you would normally have.  
If you decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time that you 
no longer want to continue. There will be no penalty and no loss of benefits or rights if you 
decide at any time to stop participating in the study.   
This research project has been approved, as required, by the Institutional Review Board of 
Appalachian State University This study was approved on 4/27/2011.  This approval will 
expire on 4/25/2012 unless the IRB renews the approval of this research. 
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I have decided I want to take part in this research.  What should I do now? 
The person obtaining informed consent will ask you to read the following and if you agree, 
you should indicate your agreement:   
 I have read (or had read to me) all of the above information.   
 I have had an opportunity to ask questions about things in this research I did not 
understand and have received satisfactory answers.   
 I understand that I can stop taking part in this study at any time.   
 I understand I am not giving up any of my rights.   
 I have been given a copy of this consent document, and it is mine to keep.  
 
By participating in this study you are giving your informed consent.  Remember that you 
have the right to withdraw from the study at any time throughout the study. 
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